I document new facts on the pattern of specialization by looking at export and import diversification. As a result of international trade, countries normally specialize in a few sectors/varieties, which tend to get exported, and diversify the importing sectors/varieties. To measure specialization, I compute concentration indexes for the value of exports and imports and decompose the overall concentration into the extensive product margin (number of products traded) and intensive product margin (volume of products traded). Using detailed product-level trade data for 151 countries, I find that exports are more concentrated than imports, specialization occurs mainly on the intensive product margin, and larger economies have more diversified exports and imports because they trade more products. Based on these novel facts, I evaluate the ability of the Eaton-Kortum model, the workhorse model of modern Ricardian trade theory, to account for the observed patterns. The results show that specialization through comparative advantage induced by technology differences explains the qualitative and quantitative facts. Also, I evaluate the role of the key determinants of specialization: the degree of comparative advantage, the elasticity of substitution and geography.
Introduction
The pattern of specialization is at the core of international trade theory. A consequence of international trade is that countries are not required to produce all their consumption goods, instead they can specialize in the production of certain goods in exchange for others. Trade theory offers different explanations of how countries specialize in the number and sales volume of goods. Assessing the empirical relevance of the underlying theory is of vital interest since it not only allows to evaluate the gains from trade through specialization but also informs how trade affects the structure of an economy.
My contribution is twofold. First, I uncover new facts on the pattern of specialization by looking at export and import concentration. I decompose the overall level of concentration into a measure for the extensive and intensive product margins and document concentration levels for exports and imports on all margins. The extensive product margin indicates the degree of specialization in the number of goods traded. The concentration index on the intensive margin measures specialization in the volume of goods traded. The second contribution consists of testing the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model's ability to account for the observed specialization patterns. Specifically, I test the model based on three basic questions about specialization: What explains the level of specialization in exports and imports? What determines the gap between specialization in exports and imports? Does specialization occur on the intensive or extensive product margin?
To start with, I establish a new set of qualitative and quantitative facts of observed crosscountry specialization patterns. Based on detailed product-level trade data for 151 countries, the results show that, on average, countries specialize more in exports relative to imports, with Gini coefficients of 0.98 and 0.92 respectively. The decomposition reveals that specialization occurs predominately on the intensive margin. Countries concentrate their exports and imports in the value of few products and, at the same time, trade a fairly wide range of goods. The difference between the concentration levels of exports and imports is explained by the number of products traded.
Countries specialize in exporting few goods and diversify on imports by acquiring various products from abroad. Focusing on cross-country differences, I find that larger economies have more diversified imports and exports. This is mostly along the extensive margin, i.e. large economies export and import a wider product range.
Having documented the observed specialization pattern, I employ a standard Ricardian trade model developed by Eaton and Kortum (2002) to evaluate its ability to reproduce the stylized facts.
My analysis relies on the Alvarez and Lucas (2007) general equilibrium extension of the Eaton and
Kortum model. A key implication of this model is that it uncovers how comparative advantage due to technology differences determines specialization endogenously on both the extensive and the intensive product margins. Furthermore, it identifies geography together with the degree of comparative advantage and the elasticity of substitution as the main determinants of specializa-tion. The degree of comparative advantage heightens the sensitivity of concentration to changes in unit costs, thereby dictating specialization on both margins. Trade costs decrease comparative advantage and increase specialization on the extensive and intensive margin. A higher elasticity of substitution provides for better substitution between intermediate goods and consequently increases concentration on the intensive margin. The model characterizes import specialization on all margins.
To calibrate the model, I follow Waugh (2010) and use data and the structure of the model to infer trade costs and the elasticities of trade and substitution. Not surprisingly, the simulated results show that the model produces the observed specialization pattern qualitatively with countries being specialized in exports and diversified in imports on all margins. More importantly, the model delivers an excessive degree of specialization on the extensive margin. As a result, the simulated concentration levels are too high and specialization is dominated by the extensive rather than the intensive product margin as observed in the data. Focusing on the variation across countries, the simulated model reproduces the fact that larger economies are more diversified but fails to account for the observed levels of concentration. Countries trade a too small range of products and specialize excessively on the extensive margin in both trade directions.
This paper contributes to the international trade literature that analyses the relationship between the pattern of trade and specialization in commodities. Leamer (1984) , who tested whether the structure of trade can be explained by the availability of resources, started an empirical literature on specialization relating the pattern of trade to factor endowments motivated by the Hechscker-Ohlin theorem, see, for example, Bowen, Leamer, and Sveikauskas (1987) , Trefler (1995) and Schott (2003) . On the other hand, MacDougall (1951) , Balassa (1963) , Golub and Hsieh (2000) and Costinot, Donaldson, and Komunjer (2012) use trade data to test the Ricardian prediction that countries export relatively more of the commodities they are relatively more productive in. Unlike these papers, the analysis in this paper does not intend to explain why countries specialize in a certain commodity, rather it uses the level of concentration in trade data to shed light on the factors that specify specialization in the number and the volume of goods traded. The levels of concentration in each trade direction contain information on the pattern of trade and as such they provide a new quantitative test of the extent of specialization observed in the data.
The analysis presented in this paper is also related to a growing literature in quantifying the importance of Ricardian comparative advantage in explaining trade patterns using the EatonKortum framework, see, for example, Chor (2010) , Shikher (2011) , Levchenko and Zhang (2011) and Costinot, Donaldson, and Komunjer (2012) . These papers specify a multi-sector Ricardian model with both inter-and intra-industry trade in order to derive implications on the sectorial level. In contrast, I abstract from intra-industry trade and attach a sectoral interpretation to the continuum of traded goods within the standard Eaton-Kortum framework. Given this notion, the number of traded sectors arises endogenously and is not assumed to be fixed as in the previous papers. While the standard model has been primarily used to explain bilateral trade flows and trade volume, (see, for example, Eaton and Kortum (2002) , Alvarez and Lucas (2007) and Waugh (2010) ), I focus on the model's implications on the pattern of trade and analyze how trade induces countries to specialize in narrow sectors. In particular, I characterize the model's predictions on export and import concentration on the intensive and extensive product margin and highlight the implications on the specialization pattern. A merit of this approach is that it uncovers how preferences, technological differences as well as geography effect specialization.
At this point, it is important to note that the Ricardian model shares with other models of international trade, most notably monopolistic competition models based on Krugman (1980) and Armington models like Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) , the ability to develop quantitative predictions about specialization patterns on the intensive and extensive margin. However, the underlying mechanisms of generating the specialization pattern differ. In monopolistic competition and Armington models, tradable goods are differentiated by location of production since each country is the sole producer of a good. Thus, countries are completely specialized in disjoint sets of goods. In the Ricardian model of Eaton and Kortum (2002) , production competes with imports because countries produce and export the same goods. As such, the Eaton and Kortum model generates incomplete specialization.
Finally, my investigation relates to the empirical growth literature analyzing the relationship between economic growth and trade patterns on the intensive and extensive margins, see Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Cadot, Carrèère, and Strauss-Kahn (2011) . Like the previous papers, I study cross-country differences by decomposing the trade pattern into extensive and intensive margins. However, my focus is not to analyze cross-country linkages between exports and economic growth by quantifying the contribution of each export margin to explain GDP differences.
Instead, I apply the decomposition to both exports and imports and use the resulting empirical evidence to test Ricardian trade theory based on the Eaton-Kortum model. My analysis shows that the Eaton-Kortum model offers a structural framework that can reconcile Hummels and Klenow's finding that larger economies export more goods and Cadot, Carrèère, and Strauss-Kahn's result that cross-country concentration differences in exports are predominately driven by the extensive margin. The novel approach of linking cross-country variation of export and import concentration to test the Eaton-Kortum model sheds light on how the interaction between preferences, technology and geography establishes trade patterns on the intensive and extensive margin. As such, the Eaton-Kortum framework can provide theoretical guidance for future work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and presents the empirical evidence of import and export concentration. Section 3 lays out the theoretical framework.
Section 4 describes the simulation results and the resulting pattern of specialization. Section 5 concludes.
Empirical evidence and data
The starting point of my analysis is an empirical assessment of the observed specialization patterns in world trade using detailed product level trade data. Before describing the data and the empirical evidence, I illustrate the properties of the concentration measurements used, which form the basis of the qualitative and quantitative tests of the model.
Concentration measurements
I compute two measures of specialization for product level sales, the Gini coefficient and the Theil index. The Theil index has the advantage of being decomposable into an extensive and intensive product margin measure. For concreteness, I focus on exports -concentration measures for imports are entirely analogous. The two measurements are defined as follows. Let k index a product among the N products in operation in the world economy, let R k be the corresponding export sales revenue, say, in a given country. The export Gini in this country is defined as :
where Cov is the covariance between export revenues R and the cumulative distribution of export revenues F(R).R denotes the average export revenue. A Gini coefficient of zero expresses complete diversification across trade revenues, i.e. (1) a country exports all products and (2) the revenues are the same across them. An index of one expresses complete specialization in which case export revenues stem from one product only. The Theil index is a weighted average of the log difference from the mean export revenue (R) and defined by the following formula
The index takes the value of zero in the case of complete diversification and ln(N) in the case of complete specialization. Cadot, Carrèère, and Strauss-Kahn (2011) decompose the Theil index into a measure for the intensive and extensive product margin, T = T ext + T int . The extensive Theil index (T ext ) captures the concentration in the number of products (extensive product margin) whereas the intensive Theil (T int ) measures the concentration in the sales volume of products (intensive product margin). The intensive Theil index is given by:
and the extensive Theil index is
N ex denotes the number of exported products andR ex represents the mean value of exported products.
Data
To build my empirical evidence, I use the Comtrade data set collected by the United Nations and choose the 6 digit HS 1992 product classification scheme as the preferred level of disaggregation, which results into 5015 products. Import flows of the same 6-digit product from different trading Based on net trade flows at the product level, I calculate first the corresponding concentration indexes on all margins for each year and then take the average over the whole sample period.
Since the concentration indexes employed are independent of scale, the calculation on a year-toyear basis avoids the need to deflate the data. Figure 1 plots the mean export against the mean import concentration for each country together with the 45 degree line. In terms of overall concentration, see Figures 1(a) and 1(b), the vast majority of observed levels lie above the 45 degree line highlighting the fact that exports are more concentrated than imports for almost all countries.
The notable exceptions are the United States, China, Germany, India, Italy, Japan and Afghanistan.
On the intensive product margin, see Figure 1 (c), the specialization level of exports is similar to imports with slightly higher levels of concentration for exports. degree line, countries export fewer products than they import. Table 1 summarizes the sample statistics with the average year-by-year indices over the 2676 country-year pairs. As implied by Figure 1 , exports are more concentrated than imports on all margins. In terms of overall concentration, the summary statistics reveal high levels of export and 1 In the appendix I present an alternative approach to account for observed intra-industry trade in the data. The basic idea is to develop a measurement device that enables the model to characterize trade within and across products. The suggested procedure converts the measurement of product units in the model to product units in the data and allows examining specialization patterns based on gross trade flows. In the rest of the paper, I follow the net trade flow approach and present the estimation and results of the alternative procedure in the appendix. import concentration with a Gini coefficient of 0.98 for exports and 0.92 for imports. A possible explanation for the high concentration levels might be that countries trade very few products between each other and hence specialization is driven by the extensive margin. However, the decomposition favors the alternative explanation. Countries export and import a fairly wide range of products but concentrate their trade in the value of few products. The share of the intensive margin with respect to overall concentration is 68 percent for imports and 51 percent for exports.
Focusing on the gap between export and import concentration, Table 1 shows that differences between exports and imports are primarily driven by the number of products traded. Countries export few and import a lot of products. In fact, the Theil index of 1.06 on the extensive margin of imports implies that, on average, a country imports a 34.4 percent of all products. On the other side, the extensive Theil index of 2.46 implies that a country exports 8.5 percent of the product range.
Turning the attention to cross country differences, the empirical evidence shows that larger economies diversify more than smaller economies. Figure 2 plots the log of the mean levels of concentration as a function of market size including the best linear fit for all margins. Market size is measured by the log of the average relative GDP to the United States (USA = 0) over the periods 1992 to 2009. As Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show, the overall Theil index is decreasing with respect to relative GDP, i.e. smaller economies specialize more. This relationship is equally strong for exports and for imports with an R square of 0.39 and 0.38 respectively. The decomposition reveals that specialization on the intensive margin does not vary with market size for both exports and imports, see Figures 2(e) and 2(f). The main driver of specialization differences across countries is the extensive margin. Particularly robust is the linear relationship on the extensive margin for exports with an R square of 0.80. Bigger economies are more diversified because they export more products. The relationship between market size and specialization on the extensive margin of imports follows a L shape pattern. As the size of an economy increases, countries diversify on imports until reaching a certain market size after which concentration is roughly equal across countries.
At this point, the key qualitative and quantitative facts have been established. First, exports are more specialized than imports on all margins. Second, overall concentration is primarily driven by specialization on the intensive rather than the extensive product margin. Third, the target levels of concentration are displayed in Table 1 . Fourth, the cross-country patterns imply a negative relationship between market size and specialization caused by the extensive margin. The rest of the paper evaluates the Ricardian model's ability to account for these stylized facts. I start by presenting the relevant parts of the Alvarez and Lucas (2007) extension of the Eaton-Kortum framework.
Model
The Eaton-Kortum model is Ricardian, with a continuum of goods produced under a constantreturns technology. The Alvarez and Lucas (2007) extension builds on the Eaton Kortum framework and introduces a non-tradable sector to establish the general equilibrium. I derive the relevant theoretical predictions on the pattern of trade and evaluate the importance of the key model parameters for specialization of imports and exports.
Consider a world economy with I countries, where each country produces tradable intermediate goods as well as non-tradable composite and final goods. Following Alvarez and Lucas (2007) , define x = (x 1 , ..., x I ) as a vector of technology draws for any given tradable good and refer to it as "good x" with x ∈ R I + . The production of an intermediate good in country i is defined by:
Technology x i differs between goods and is drawn independently from a common exponential distribution with density φ and a country specific technology parameter λ i , i.e. x i ∼ exp(1/λ i ). 
where
. The continuum of intermediate input goods x enters the production of the composite good q i symmetrically with a constant elasticity of substitution (η > 0)
The produced aggregate intermediate good q i can then be allocated costless towards the production of final goods or being used as an input in the production of intermediate goods. Similarly, labor, as the only primary factor input, can be used either to produce intermediate or final goods.
Finally, consumers draw their utility linearly from the final good. All markets are perfectly com-petitive. Since these features are not central to the implications I derived in this paper, I omit them.
The interested reader is refereed to Alvarez and Lucas (2007) for the full description of the model.
General equilibrium
Once a country opens to international goods markets, the intermediate goods are the only goods traded. Final goods and labor do not move between countries. Due to trade costs, factor prices will not equalize across countries. The intermediate goods needed to produce the composite good will be acquired from the producer of good x in the country that operates at lowest unit costs.
Trading these intermediate goods between countries is costly. We define "Iceberg" transportation costs for good x from country i to country j by κ i,j where κ i,j < 1 ∀ i = j and κ i,i = 1 ∀i.
As in Alvarez and Lucas (2007), we also consider tariffs. ω i,j is the tariff charged by country i on goods imported from country j. Tariffs distort international trade but do not entail a physical loss of resources. Incorporating the trade costs, composite good producers in country i will buy the intermediate good x from country j that offers the lowest price
Equation 5 shows that whether country i specializes in the production of good x depends on the productivity realizations, factor prices and trade costs. The set of goods where country i obtains the minimum price at home is denoted by B i,i ⊂ R I + . If country i does not offer a good at lowest costs in the local market, the good is imported. Following Alvarez and Lucas, the resulting price index of tradable goods in country i is
where A = Γ(1 + θ(η − 1)) is the Gamma function evaluated at point (1 + θ(η − 1)). Next, we calculate the expenditure shares for each country i. Let D i,j be the fraction of country i's per capita spending p m,i q i on tradables that is spent on goods from country j. Then, we can write total spending of i on goods from j as
where B i,j defines the set of goods country j attains a minimum in equation 5. Note that D i,j is simply the probability that country j is selling good x in country i at the lowest price and calculated to be
Equation 7 shows that in this model the sensitivity of trade between countries i and j depends on the level of technology λ, trade costs ω, geographic barriers κ and the technological parameter θ (reflecting the heterogeneity of goods in production) and is independent of the elasticity of substitution η. This result is due to the assumption that η is common across countries and does not distort relative good prices across countries. Note also that by the law of large numbers, the probability that country i imports from country j is identical to the share of goods country i imports from j. In this sense, trade shares respond to costs and geographic barriers at the extensive margin: As a source becomes more expensive or remote it exports/imports a narrower range of goods. It is important to keep in mind that the amount of input industries into the production of the composite good is fixed. Each country uses the whole continuum of intermediate goods to produce composite goods. There are no gains of trade due to an increased number of varieties.
Welfare gains are realized through incomplete specialization. Domestic production competes with imports and countries specialize through the reallocation of resources made available by the exit of inefficient domestic producers.
Finally, to close the model, we impose that total payments to foreigners (imports) are equal to total receipts from foreigners (exports) for all countries i
The previous equation implies an excess demand system which depends only on wages. Solving this system, describes the equilibrium wages rate for each country together with the corresponding equilibrium prices and quantities. Next, I describe the model's predictions on export and import concentration on both margins.
Concentration of exports and imports
In the model, the pattern of trade is established by domestic producers competing with importers for selling intermediate goods in the local market. If foreign producers selling a particular good at a lower price than domestic ones, the good will be imported from the cheapest source. Given the equilibrium price, p(x), and quantity, q(x), the total expenditure that country i spends (c.i.f.) on imported good x, R i,M (x), is:
Equivalently, domestic producers export the good to all the foreign markets where they obtain the minimum price. The set of exporting goods is simply a collection of the set of goods country i exports to any destination j, x ∈ ∪ I j =i B j,i . As a result, (f.o.b.) export revenue sales of good x, R i,X (x), are given by :
Given the described pattern of trade, the concentration index for imports is identified. To show this, I decompose the overall concentration into a concentration measure for the intensive and extensive product margin. Using equation 3, the Theil index for the concentration of imports on the intensive production margin can be written as:
In the appendix I show that the distribution of import expenditures follows a Fréchet distribution with shape parameter 1/θ(η − 1) and scale parameter s i . Solving the integral, the intensive Theil index of imports for country i becomes:
where Γ(.) stands for the Gamma function. Import specialization on the intensive margin is independent of equilibrium prices, trade costs, geography and the level of technology λ. It is solely determined by preferences (i.e the elasticities of substitution) and heterogeneity in production (i.e.
the degree of comparative advantage). A higher elasticity of substitution (η) increases specialization by allowing producers in the aggregate intermediate good sector to better substitute less for high productive goods. Similar, an increase in the degree of comparative advantage (θ), which corresponds to a higher variance of productivity realizations across products, heightens the degree of specialization.
To compute the concentration of imports on the extensive margin, I use the fact that the set of goods produced is disjoint form the set of goods imported. Consequently, we can express the share of goods imported as 1 minus the share of goods produced, (1 − D ii ). The Theil index for the extensive margin of imports is equal to :
and depends on the level of technology and equilibrium prices.
To assess the level of specialization in exports, I simulate the model within a discrete product space. I calculate the export concentration index on the intensive margin according to equation 3.
The extensive Theil index on the extensive margin is given by the inverse share of the number of goods exported, N i,X , with respect to the total number of simulated goods, N.
Having outlined the pattern of trade and the corresponding implications on the specialization pattern of exports and imports, the next section discusses the simulation of the model. It contains special cases of equilibria designed to spell out step-by-step the main implications of the model on export and import concentration and in further instance on specialization.
Calibration and simulation
To simulate the theoretical model, which assumes an infinite amount of goods, I "discretize" the 
Symmetric countries
All countries are identical with respect to their size L i = L and technology parameter λ i = λ. Trade costs are symmetric and set to κ i,j = κ ∀ i = j with κ i,i = 1 and ω i,j = 1 ∀i, j. I solve for the equilibrium wage in each country, all good prices and the value of imports and exports.
Due to symmetry, wages and composite good prices equalize across countries. Trade costs distort international trade. In comparison to free trade, firms will not be able to buy good x from the cheapest producer world wide and rely more on home production. The corresponding trade share matrix D is symmetric and the (i, j) element is given by:
where D i,j is the set of goods country j exports to country i and D ii the set of goods country i produces at home. In free trade, κ = 1, each country's intermediate good producers specialize in a distinct set of goods equal to the relative size of the economy and export all products produced, D ii = D ij = 1/I. The corresponding share of imported products is 1 − D ii = (I − 1)/I. In this case, Ricardian specialization forces are strongest and the gap between export and import concentration reaches a maximum.
Concentration on the Extensive Margin
The concentration index of imports equals the share of goods country i imports from all countries in the world and is given by:
Concentration at the extensive margin of imports depends negatively on the number of trading partners I − 1 and positively on the degree of comparative advantage θ and geographical barriers κ. In the case of exports, I simulate the model and compute the set of exporting products numerically. The simulations show that the concentration of exports increases with geographical barriers, the degree of comparative advantage and the number of trading partners. In general, a larger number of trading partners increases competition between production and imports in the domestic market resulting in the production of fewer goods at home and an increase in the number of goods imported. Also, more trading partners increase competition among exporters in foreign markets forcing countries to specialize more on the extensive margin of exports. Impediments to trade, i.e. a reduction in κ, and a higher degree of comparative advantage, θ, reduce import competition and, as a result, fewer goods are exported and imported. Notice that in the special case of free trade all goods produced are exported and concentration of production equals concentration of exports. With trade costs, countries export a subset of produced goods leading to more concentration on the export side relative to production.
Concentration on the Intensive Margin
As noted previously, the distribution of imports follows a Fréchet distribution where the concentration indexes depend only on the elasticity of substitution (η) and the degree of comparative advantage (θ). Consequently, given θ and the concentration of imports observed in the data, I can pin down the elasticity of substitution. Concerning the distribution of export revenues across products, the simulation shows that it depends positively on the elasticity of substitution (η), the degree of comparative advantage (θ) and geographical barriers (κ). The number of trading partners has non-monotone effects on the concentration of exports at the intensive margin. Few trading partners increase concentration because high revenue generating exports are sold in more markets whereas products with low revenue are exported only to few countries. However, as the number of trading partners increases, the degree of competition in the export markets increases and countries export only high revenue generating products. Thus, after a threshold level, concentration among export revenues reduces with the number of trading partners. In the case of free trade, countries export all their goods to all desti- The results presented in Table 2 show that the free trade calibration of Alvarez and Lucas (2007) is able to replicate the qualitative fact that, overall, exports are more concentrated than imports.
While the simulated level of export concentration attains the degree of specialization observed in the data, in the benchmark free trade parametrization countries diversify excessively in imports.
Focusing on the decomposition reveals the underlying reason: countries import too many goods and the value of those goods is too evenly distributed. Using the fact that for a given value of θ, import concentration on the intensive margin is solely determined by the elasticity of substitution, I calibrate η = 7.3 to match the level observed in the data 3 . As we can see in row 2 of Table 2 , this alters the level of import concentration by allowing composite good producers to better substitute between intermediate inputs.
To reduce the gap between export and import concentration caused by the extensive product margin, I introduce 40 percent symmetric trade costs to all trading partners, κ = 0.71. Row 3 of Table 2 features the results. Impediments to trade reduce the number of products exported and imported. Consequently, concentration on the extensive margin increases for both exports and imports. Concentration on the intensive margin of exports decreases. Because of trade costs, only efficient producers remain exporters allowing them to distribute their export revenues more evenly across products and trade partners. Although the gap between export and import concentration 2 The intuition behind this result is that preferences are such that the import expenditure distribution is the same for each trading partner. In the appendix, I show in detail that the expenditure distribution of bilateral trade, E ij (qp), between importer i and exporter j is the same for each source country j, i.e. E ij (qp) = E i (qp), ∀j ∈ I. Furthermore, the bilateral import expenditure distribution, E i (qp), is Fréchet with common shape parameter 1/(θ(η − 1)) and country specific scale parameter s i . The shape parameters are identical because preferences are common across countries. Note that the bilateral import expenditure distribution of country i, E i (qp), equals the export revenue distribution of country j. In free trade with symmetric countries the exporting country ships the exact same goods to all countries. As a consequence, overall export revenue distribution of country j is equal to the import expenditure distribution of each country scaled up by the number of trading partners. Since the concentration indexes are independent of scale, the concentration of exports and imports on the intensive margin equalize.
3 This value is consistent with previous ones found in the literature, see Broda and Weinstein (2006) . narrows slightly, the difference is still substantial. The reason is that the degree of competition countries face in export and domestic markets is too high. Introducing infinite trade costs by limiting the amount of trading partners (NT) reduces competition in all markets and improves the fit of the model on all dimensions, see the fourth row of Table 2 . Less competition in the domestic market increases the survival rate of domestic industries and reduces the amount of goods imported. Infinite trade costs reduce the number of countries competing in a particular market and increases the probability to export to any of them. As a result, the gap between export and import concentration diminishes. Note that revenues of exporting industries are now geographically more concentrated and hence specialization on the intensive margin of exports intensifies.
In sum, with the introduction of symmetric trade costs, the model can replicate the mean levels of concentration observed in the data. The key parameters are the elasticities of substitution η and the trade cost function κ. In particular, by limiting the amount of trading partners, which amounts to introduce zeros in the bilateral trade matrix, we can calibrate the model to explain the pattern of specialization at the mean.
Asymmetric countries
In this section I analyze the effects of cross-country heterogeneity on specialization. The empirical facts imply a negative relationship between specialization and market size. For this reason I introduce heterogeneity in technology λ i and size L i to reflect observed GDP differences in the data. To do so, I consider the model's free trade equilibrium relationship between wages, size and technology. Under the assumption of free trade, the equilibrium wage is given by :
Using equation 11, I back out the level of technology, 
Concentration on the Extensive Margin
Plugging in the equilibrium wage into equation 7, I get the corresponding trade share matrix D with the (i, j) element given by:
Equation 12 shows that under the assumption of free trade countryi's share of number of products exported is equal to its relative level of GDP with respect to world GDP. Hence, larger economies export more products and import less products compared to small economies. This result is at odds with the empirical evidence. In the data, larger economies are more diversified on exports and on imports. In the next section I introduce trade costs and argue that trade costs have to be asymmetric in order to replicate the empirical observations.
Concentration on the Intensive Margin
On the intensive margin, under the assumptions of homogenous tastes across countries and free trade, export and import concentration equalize. In this case, export and import concentration on the intensive margin depend only on θ and η and are unaffected by the introduction of heterogeneity in technology and country size.
Asymmetric trade costs
To reconcile the cross-country concentration differences for imports, I introduce asymmetric trade costs. In particular, I consider trade costs as a function of an exporter (ex j ) or an importer (im i ) fixed effect. The next paragraphs show the different implications of each effect.
Importer fixed effect
Under the assumption of an importer fixed effect, country i faces the same cost of importing independent of the origin country j. The trade cost matrix becomes κ i,j = im i ∀j = i and κ i,i = 1 ∀j = i. Due to asymmetric trade costs, wages and composite good prices do not equalize. The trade share matrix is asymmetric and given by:
Focusing on the expression for the share of goods that country j imports from country i, D j,i , shows that higher import costs (im i ↓) reduce the number of goods country j imports from i. Solving for the equilibrium and assuming that price differences across countries are approximately equal to the import cost differences, one can show that the corresponding share of goods imported is approximately:
where C 1 is a constant independent of country i. Equation 13 shows that an importer fixed effect can counterbalance the fact that larger economies import less under the assumption that they face lower costs to import. Lower import costs increase the share of goods imported, (∂(1 − D ii )/∂im i > 0), and lead to a reduction in the unit cost of production through a lower price index of tradable goods.
Exporter fixed effect
In the case of an exporter fixed effect, each country pays a country specific cost to export, which is independent of the importing country i, κ i,j = ex j ∀j = i and κ i,i = 1 ∀j = i. The trade share matrix is asymmetric and given by:
Here the expression for D j,i implies that a higher export cost (ex i ↓) reduces the number of goods country i exports to any destination j. Solving for the equilibrium and assuming that composite good prices across countries are approximately equal, one can show that the share of goods imported is approximately given by:
where C 2 represents a constant independent of country i. Equation 14 shows that the share of goods imported is decreasing in the country specific exporting costs, (∂(1 − D ii )/∂ex i > 0). Lower exporting costs lead to higher domestic wages, increasing unit costs of production and result in a larger share of imported goods. Hence, an exporter fixed effect can reconcile the fact that larger economies import more by assuming that (1) larger economies face lower costs to export and (2) the effect of GDP on the export cost offsets the effect of GDP on the share of goods imported,
The main difference between the importer and the exporter fixed effect lies in the implication on the price level of tradable goods. The exporter fixed effect implies a nearly constant price level of tradable goods across countries. As a result, unit cost differences between countries are driven predominantly by wage differences. On the contrary, the importer fixed effect leads to large crosscountry price level differences with smaller economies facing higher a higher price level. In this case, unit cost differences are driven by wage and price level differences. Based on Waugh (2010)'s results that countries have similar price levels of tradable goods, I focus in the rest of my analysis only on the case of a country specific export costs.
In sum, the introduction of asymmetric trade costs in form of a country specific cost to export or import allows the model to replicate the import specialization pattern across countries, in particular when larger economies face relative lower costs to either export or import. Waugh (2010) argues that trade costs have to be asymmetric, with poor countries facing higher costs to export relative to rich countries, in order to reconcile bilateral trade volumes and price data. While both our approaches highlight the importance of asymmetric trade costs in explaining trade data, our analysis differs. Waugh uses the Eaton Kortum model to explain bilateral trade volumes and price data whereas I look on the model's implications on the specialization pattern of exports and imports. In this respect, the results presented in this paper provide further evidence on the importance of asymmetry in trade costs when studying trade volumes and trade patterns across countries. In terms of cross country differences, calibrated GDP differences in combination with zero or symmetric trade costs lead to the false prediction that larger economies import less goods. To reconcile the empirical evidence, I introduce a country specific cost to export with larger economies facing relative lower export costs. I calculate the implied export cost from equation 14 by replacing the share of goods produced at home by the extensive Theil index of imports observed in the
. Row 2 of table 3 presents the results of the corresponding mean concentration levels. While the model matches the cross country concentration pattern, the mean level of export concentration is twice as high as in the data. The reason being excessive competition in the export markets, which results in particular high levels of concentration on the extensive margin of exports. To counter the competition effect, I create trading blocks between countries of size 9 (i.e. number of trading partners NT = 8) by introducing infinite trade costs. In addition, I assume that countries trade within a block with countries whose economic size is similar. 4 Trade blocks conditional on economic size improve the fit of the model. The obtained concentration levels match the data on all dimension. Row 3 of Table 3 presents the results. Countries are more concentrated in exports than in imports on all margins, the intensive margin dominates in terms of overall concentration for both exports and imports and the simulated concentration levels are close to the target levels. In terms of the cross country pattern figure 3 plots the simulated (in red) and the empirical (in blue) concentration levels against GDP for both margins. The figure shows that the exporter fixed effect in combination with technology and endowment differences can replicate the across country evidence on all margins. Bigger economies are more diversified because they import/export more products and concentration patterns on the intensive margin are insensitive to market size.
In the previous section I analyzed special cases of the equilibrium to study the different factors that determine specialization in the Eaton Kortum model. The key determinants are the degree of comparative advantage, the elasticity of substitution and asymmetric trade costs. However, I treated trade costs as free parameters and showed that for a particular configuration of trade costs, the model is able to reproduce concentration levels at the mean as well as the cross-country specialization pattern for both exports and imports. In the next section, I estimate trade cost and technology parameters based on bilateral trade shares using the models structure and check whether for given trade shares, the model is able to generate the observed specialization pattern in the data.
Estimating trade costs from bilateral trade shares
The starting point of the estimation of technology and trade costs is a structural log-linear "grav- 
in which S i presents the structural parameters and is defined as S i = log(w
. In order to estimate trade costs κ and technology λ implied by equation 15 I use data on bilateral trade shares across 151 countries. I calculate the corresponding bilateral trade share matrix by the ratio of total gross imports of country i form country j divided by absorption Abs i
where M (x k )i,j represents total imports of of country i from country j. Absorption is defined as total GDP plus total imports NM i minus total exports NX i . Note there are only I 2 − I informative moments and I 2 parameters of interest. Thus, restrictions on the parameter space are necessary.
To create them, I follow Eaton and Kortum (2002) and assume the following functional form of trade costs.
Trade costs are a logarithmic function of distance (d k ) a shared border effect between country i and 
From the obtained prices and the estimates inŜ, I get the convolution of wages and technology, 
where s f i is the labor share in the production of final goods and F i is the fraction of country i spending on tradable goods net of tariff expenses.
The obtained equilibrium wages together with tradable good prices, determine the implied technology levelsλ for each country given the structural estimates of the gravity equation. Having identified trade costs and technology, see Table 6 for the estimated technology levels, I simulate the Eaton and Kortum model to test whether the calibrated version can replicate the concentration levels observed in the data. Table 5 shows that, similar to exports, the majority of products is imported by few countries. In the model, 90 percent of products are imported by less than 35 countries whereas in the data the same number of products is imported by 25 or more countries. The cause are high import costs, which prevent countries from taking advantage of cheaper goods from abroad.
Robustness checks
The first part addresses concerns on the robustness of the empirical observed concentration indexes. In particular, the level of disaggregation as well as the classification scheme chosen may affect the empirical concentration measures and the decomposition of the intensive and extensive margin. For this reason, I re-calculated the concentration indexes on all margins by defining a product to correspond to a 4 digit SITC code instead of a 6 digit HS code. The implied product space changes significantly as it comprises only 792 products compared to 5015 products using 6 digit HS codes. Also, the SITC classification scheme differs from the HS classification scheme by grouping products based on economic functions rather than their material and physical properties. The empirical estimates of the SITC industry classification are very similar to the 6 digit HS code sample. The correlation coefficient between the SITC and HS concentration indexes is 0.9 for exports and 0.7 for imports. The obtained concentration levels are slightly lower because of the higher level of aggregation. However, the core results remain the same. Exports are more con-centrated than imports on all margins and the intensive margin dominates concentration for both exports and imports. The obtained shares of the intensive margin in terms of overall concentration are almost identical to the standard sample with 55 percent for exports and 66 percent for imports.
Also, the cross country concentration patterns feature a negative log linear relationship between concentration on the extensive margin and market size for both exports and imports. In sum, the obtained results on the 4 digit SITC level support the empirical evidence based on the 6 digit HS classification and highlight the level of generality my results apply.
Another concern may be that the results are driven by trade in agricultural products and natural resources. Oil and Gas are the products with the largest trading volume and can therefore Finally I want to address the discrepancy of the product space between the data and the model caused by intra-industry trade. In the main part of the paper I establish correspondence between the model and the data by netting out within product trade and considering only trade across products. This approach leaves valuable information unused and may bias the results because intra-industry trade flows occur predominantly between OECD countries and to a lesser extend between developing countries. In an alternative approach, I deal with intra-industry trade by developing a "measurement device" that enables the model to characterize trade within and across products. The basic idea is that in reality the true state of the world is indeed Ricardian, i.e. varieties are in fact products, but the data are not sufficiently disaggregated to capture the true product level. Instead, these "Ricardian products" are aggregated into sectors according to a classification scheme, i.e. HS codes. The suggested procedure converts the measurement of product units in the model to product units in the data and allows to examine gross trade flows. Because the classification scheme is unobserved, I assume that varieties are randomly assigned to an HS code following a Poisson process. Using the structure of the model, I can then estimate the Poisson parameter and characterize the "measurement device" completely. I obtain a value of 7 for the Poisson parameter 5 The appendix contains detailed results for both approaches.
implying that, on average, 7 "Ricardian products" comprise an HS product category. Based on this result, I apply the Poisson process to group simulated Ricardian products randomly into artificial HS codes for which I calculate the implied concentration indexes. The results, presented in detail in the appendix, show that this approach leads to similar results as the net trade flow approach. In particular, it implies a similar value for the elasticity of substitution, η = 8 (compared to η = 7.3 in the net trade sample), and an exporter fixed effect to reconcile the cross country concentration pattern on the intensive margin. However, mean trade costs are with κ = 0.6 significantly higher than the κ = 0.71 mean trade costs in the net trade flow case.
Conclusion
Export and import concentration in combination with a decomposition into an extensive and intensive product margin concentration measure provide new quantitative and qualitative evidence on specialization patterns in world trade. Based on detailed trade data, my calculations show that exports are more concentrated than imports on all margins and specialization is dominated by the intensive product margin. The extensive product margin explains the gap between export and import concentration and drives specialization differences across countries. Larger economies diversify more because they export and import more products.
These qualitative findings together with the calculated concentration levels provide a new test for trade theory. Evaluating the empirical performance of the underlying theory is important because the derived theoretical predictions have decisive implications on the effect of trade on production and further instance on welfare. In this paper, I evaluate the ability of the Eaton Kortum model, the workhorse model of modern Ricardian trade theory, to account for the observed patterns. My findings show that the calibrated model is able to replicate the empirical evidence qualitatively but fails to account for the levels of specialization. In particular, the model produces an excessive degree of specialization on the extensive margin for both exports and imports. The main reasons why countries export and import too few products are high trade costs and the underlying productivity distribution. The Fréchet distribution generates extremely efficient producers of tradable goods enabling them to capture the whole world market and resulting in too few exporters per product. High trade costs prevent countries from importing more goods. However, if trade costs are chosen arbitrarily, the model is flexible enough to replicate the empirical results on all margins.
Finally, I want to stress that my analysis can be readily applied to other trade theories as well.
In this paper I study specialization patterns in the Ricardian framework assuming that specialization patterns emerge through comparative advantage induced by technological differences. Other models of international trade, most notably monopolistic competition based on Krugman (1980) and Armington models, also develop quantitative predictions about specialization patterns. However, in both types of models, goods are differentiated by location of production and countries completely specialize in disjoint sets of goods requiring an adaption of the product space in the empirical analysis. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to compare the performance of both types of models to the results in this paper in order to gain further insights on the relevance of each trade theory. FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN GAB GAB GAB GAB GAB GAB GAB GAB GAB GAB GAB GAB GAB GAB GAB GAB GAB GAB
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